Financial turmoil and the economy by anonymous
T
he year 2008 marked a watershed for 
the modern global financial system 
and presented the Federal Reserve 
with some of the greatest challenges 
in its history. The financial market turmoil 
that started in the previous year worsened 
substantially during 2008, and its effect on 
real economic activity was substantial. Fac-
ing the mutually reinforcing combination of 
the most serious impairment of our financial 
system and the potentially worst economic 
downturn  since  World  War  II,  the  Federal 
Reserve  took  unprecedented  actions  as  it 
strived to restore economic growth, job cre-
ation, and financial stability, as well as to pre-
serve price stability, an effort that continues 
in 2009 (see Box 1: Financial Crisis Timeline).
The intensification of the turmoil in finan-
cial markets in 2008 was due in part to the 
marked  deterioration  in  conditions  in  the 
housing and residential mortgage markets. 
As documented in last year’s annual report, 
The Subprime Mortgage Market: National and 
Twelfth District Developments, the end of the 
credit and housing boom in the second half 
of 2005 unveiled earlier excesses that even-
tually led to the swelling of mortgage delin-
quencies and the eruption of financial mar-
ket turmoil in August of 2007. In 2008, amid 
the steepening of house-price depreciation, 
the economy weakened substantially and the 
number of mortgage delinquencies climbed 
even higher. 
The  buildup  of  financial  stress  in  2008 
extended  far  beyond  the  housing  and  the 
residential mortgage markets. In the earlier 
boom years, asset values in general were in-
flated in an environment of unusually low 
risk  spreads,  heightened  reliance  on  finan-
cial leverage, and the proliferation of com-
plex and opaque financial instruments that 
proved to be fragile under stress. As market 
forces corrected these excesses, the simulta-
neous re-pricing of risks, deleveraging, and 
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tions unleashed powerful forces across finan-
cial markets in 2008. 
Market Participants Lose Confidence
Resolution of the financial crisis is compli-
cated by a profound loss of investor and pub-
lic confidence in the strength of key financial 
markets  and  institutions.  The  loss  of  confi-
dence stems in part from uncertainty about 
the extent of potential financial losses in the 
face of deteriorating economic conditions and 
the  difficulty  of  valuing  complex  financial 
securities. Confidence is further undermined 
by the limited disclosure by financial insti-
tutions on their portfolio compositions and 
asset holdings, which makes it difficult to as-
sess their exposure to losses. Many of these 
institutions are especially vulnerable owing 
to their very high leverage and heavy reliance 
on very short-term funding.  
During the year, the loss of confidence led 
to serious impairment and, in some cases, a 
freezing up of credit flows in key markets. One 
notable example is the term interbank mar-
ket—that is, the market in which banks lend to 
each other for periods longer than overnight. 
Due to concerns about the ability of borrow-
ers  in  the  interbank  market  to  repay  loans 
and the desire of banks to protect their own 
capital  and  liquidity  positions,  the  spreads 
on  term  interbank  borrowing  rates  relative 
to the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates—a 
key measure of funding stress—spiked to un-
charted territory following several high pro-
file events during 2008, such as the forced sale 
of Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers  (see  Chart  1).1  Other  examples  of 
credit  market  impairment  during  the  year 
included the sharp slowdown of commercial 
1	 The	OIS	rate	is	the	fixed	leg	underlying	the	derivative	contract	between	two	parties	swapping	overnight	federal	funds	with	term	federal	funds.
During the year, the loss of confidence led to serious 
impairment and, in some cases, a freezing up of credit 
flows in key markets.
Serious impairment of the term interbank funding market
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fund “broke the buck”—when its share value fell 
below one dollar—and the elevated risk spreads 
on  mortgage-backed  securities  (MBS)  that  are 
guaranteed by the two government-sponsored 
enterprises  (GSEs),  Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie 
Mac, even after they were placed in conservator-
ship by the federal government.
Household and Business  
Credit Stifled 
The impairment of financial markets severe-
ly stifled credit flows to households and busi-
nesses. Issuance of private-label MBS, both for 
residential and commercial mortgages, essen-
tially evaporated (see Chart 2), and the securiti-
zation of consumer and business-related loans 
Target Federal Funds Rate
(right scale)
Jun. 7:   Bear Stearns suspends redemptions from its High-Grade 
Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund
Jul. 11:  Standard and Poor’s places 612 securities backed by 
subprime residential mortgages on credit watch
Jul. 31:  Bear Stearns liquidates two hedge funds that invested in MBS
Aug. 6:   American Home Mortgage files for bankruptcy
Aug. 9:   BNP Paribas halts redemptions on three 
investment funds
Aug. 10: Central banks provide liquidity
Aug. 17: Fed approves temporary changes
to discount window
Dec. 12:   Fed establishes TAF and FX swap lines with ECB and SNB
Mar. 7:   Fed initiates term RPs with 
primary dealers
Mar. 11:  Fed establishes TSLF; FX 
swap lines with ECB and 
SNB increase
Mar. 14:  JPMorgan Chase to acquire 
Bear Stearns
Mar. 16:  Fed establishes PDCF; 
makes changes to discount 
window
Mar. 24:  JPMorgan Chase facility 
(Maiden Lane LLC) 
announced
Box 1:   Financial Crisis Timeline: Federal Funds Target Rate and Other Policy Actions
                Acronym Legend
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market 
    Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF)
Bank holding company (BHC)
Bank of Canada (BOC)
Bank of England (BOE)
Bank of Japan (BOJ)
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)
European Central Bank (ECB)
Foreign exchange (FX)
Government-Sponsored Enterprise (GSE)
Limited Liability Corporation (LLC)
Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF)
Mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ)
Repurchase agreements (RPs)
Swiss National Bank (SNB)
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF)
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
Term Auction Facility (TAF)
Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF)
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Percent Sep. 7:   Fannie and Freddie placed in conservatorship
Sep. 14:  PDCF and TSLF collateral expands; Fed provides temporary exception to Section 23A limits
Sep. 15:  Lehman Brothers to file for bankruptcy
Sep. 16:  AIG receives loan
Sep. 17:  Treasury announces Supplementary Financing Program
Sep. 18:  Fed establishes FX swap lines with BOJ, BOE, and BOC
Sep. 19:  Fed establishes AMLF
Sep. 22:  Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley become BHCs
Sep. 24:  Fed establishes FX swap lines with other central banks
Sep. 25:  Washington Mutual fails
Sep. 26:  FX swap lines increase
Sep. 29:  Changes to TAF; FX swap lines increase
Oct. 6:   Fed pays interest on bank reserves 
Oct. 7:   Fed announces CPFF
Oct. 9:   Wells Fargo acquires Wachovia
Oct. 14:  Treasury announces Capital Purchase Program; FDIC announces Temporary 
Liquidity Guarantee Program
Oct. 21:  Fed announces MMIFF
Oct. 27:  Fed launches CPFF
Oct. 28:  Fed establishes FX swap lines with RBNZ
Oct. 29:  Fed establishes new FX swap lines with other central banks
Nov. 10:  AIG support restructured
Nov. 23:  Citigroup receives federal support
Nov. 25:  Fed announces TALF and programs to purchase GSE debt and agency MBS
Dec. 2:   PDCF, AMLF, TSLF extended
Jan. 5:   Purchase of agency MBS begins
Jan. 16:  Bank of America receives federal support
Feb. 10:  Treasury’s Financial Stability Plan 
includes stress test of large banks 
and expansion of TALF
Feb. 23:  Treasury initiates Capital Assistance 
Program
Feb. 27:  Treasury announces participation in 
Citigroup exchange offering
Mar. 2:  Fed and Treasury announce 
AIG restructuring plan
Mar. 3:  TALF launches
Mar. 4:  Federal financial regulatory 
agencies announce 
support of the “Making 
Homes Affordable” loan 
modification program
Mar. 18:  Fed announces plans 
to purchase long-term 
Treasury debt and increase 
purchase of GSE debt and 
agency MBS
Mar. 19:  Set of eligible collateral for 
TALF expands
nose-dived.  Commercial  banks  also  severely 
tightened credit terms and lending standards 
during 2008. Although lending by commercial 
banks expanded in 2008, the expansion did not 
offset contractions in other sources of private 
funding. On net, credit availability to house-
holds and businesses was exceptionally tight.
Our economic system is critically dependent 
on well-functioning financial markets and sound 
financial  institutions  that  mediate  the  flow  of 
credit. The impairment of financial markets and 
credit flows took a heavy toll on the economy. 
With the United States officially in a recession 
during all of 2008, the economy lost about 2.6 
million  jobs,  the  worst  12-month  period  since 
World War II. This created an adverse feedback 
Jul. 3:   Maiden Lane LLC
established
Jul. 13:   Fannie and Freddie allowed
access to discount window
Jul. 30:   PDCF and TSLF extended; 
TAF expands;   
FX swap lines increase
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fied stress in the financial sector, which in turn 
further  squeezed  economic  activity,  creating  a 
mutually reinforcing cycle (see Chart 3).
Policy Actions
An  important  lesson  from  both  economic 
theory and history is that policymakers must 
confront circumstances like these with prompt 
and aggressive action. Even so, in the first half 
of 2008, the conduct of monetary policy was 
complicated by rising commodity prices that 
pushed  up  the  headline  inflation  rate.  The 
Federal  Open  Market  Committee  (FOMC) 
nonetheless expected inflationary pressures to 
subside, and longer-term inflation expectations 
appeared to be stable. With the serious threat 
to economic growth from the financial crisis, 
the FOMC cut the federal funds rate target by 
roughly  five  percentage  points  in  the  period 
following the onset of the crisis. In December 
2008, the FOMC took the historic step of low-
ering  the  federal  funds  rate  essentially  to  its 
“zero bound,” establishing a target range of 0 
to 1/ 4  percent. 
Expanded Policy Toolbox
Due to the extraordinary stress in financial 
markets,  in  addition  to  lowering  the  federal 
funds rate target, the Federal Reserve employed 
a set of new tools to improve the functioning of 
credit markets, ease financial conditions, and 
support economic activity more generally. As 
early  as  December  2007,  the  Federal  Reserve 
established the first of a number of new liquid-
ity and credit facilities, the Term Auction Facil-
ity (TAF), to address the dislocation in the term 
interbank market.2 This facility was set up as an 
auction and served as another vehicle for ex-
tending discount window loans to depository 
institutions. Amid the global scope of the finan-
cial crisis, the Federal Reserve also supported 
the provision of U.S. dollar liquidity in foreign 
markets  by  vastly  expanding  its  network  of 
currency swap lines with other central banks 
starting in December of 2007. 
These  facilities  for  providing  liquidity  to 
depositories  are  in  keeping  with  the  Federal 
Reserve’s traditional role as lender of last re-
sort.  However,  since  the  financial  crisis  also 
hit  nonbank  financial  institutions  and  key 
markets, providing liquidity to depository in-
stitutions alone was not sufficient to meet the 
liquidity and credit demands of the economy. 
In response, the Federal Reserve employed a 
number of other new tools, some of which in-
volved using the Fed’s authority to make direct 
purchases of U.S. government agency securi-
ties. For others, the Federal Reserve invoked 
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to lend 
in “unusual and exigent circumstances” to “in-
dividuals, partnerships, or corporations” that 
are “unable to secure adequate credit accom-
modations  from  other  banking  institutions.” 
Under  this  authority,  the  Federal  Reserve 
initiated  a  number  of  special  credit  facilities 
to extend credit to a broader range of counter-
parties, against a broader set of collateral, and 
for relatively longer terms (see Box 2: Federal 
Reserve Bank Credit).
The goals of these policy tools are to pro-
mote the dissemination of liquidity, foster the 
liquidity  of  key  securities,  increase  the  flow 
of  credit  to  seriously  impaired  sectors,  and 
lower interest rates in targeted nonbank credit   
2	 To	further	ease	liquidity	pressures	at	quarter-	and	year-end,	the	Federal	Reserve	announced	the	forward	auctions	of	TAF	loans	on	July	30,	2008.	
Adverse feedback loop: financial crisis and severe recession



























Real GDP Growth and Core PCE Inflation
GDP: Gross domestic product
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* Previously established program or facility. ** Off balance sheet. 
1.   On August 17, 2007, the Federal Reserve reduced to 50 basis points (b.p.) the spread for the primary credit rate over the federal funds target and allowed 30-days loans.  On March 17, 2008, the Federal 
Reserve reduced to 25 b.p. the spread for the primary credit rate over the federal funds target and allowed up to 90-day loans. 
2.   Eligible institutions are U.S. depository institutions and branches and agencies of foreign banks operating in the U.S. 
3.   Eligible collateral includes (but is not limited to) U.S. government and agency securities, foreign sovereign debt obligations, municipal and corporate debt, ABS, CP, bank-issued assets, and customer 
obligations. 
4.   Programs created with: European Central Bank and Swiss National Bank (December 12, 2007); Bank of Canada, Bank of England, and Bank of Japan (September 18, 2008); Reserve Bank of Australia, 
Sveriges Riksbank, De Nederlandsche Bank, and Norges Bank (September 24, 2008); Reserve Bank of New Zealand (October 28, 2008); Banco Central do Brasil, Banco de Mexico, Bank of Korea, and 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (October 29, 2008). 
5.   Eligible collateral must be rated A1/P1/F1 by at least two of the rating agencies. The funding rate is equal to the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s primary credit rate. 
6.   Term repurchase agreements authorized on March 7, 2008. 
7.   Eligible collateral includes U.S. Treasury securities, direct agency obligations, and agency MBS that are eligible as collateral in open market operations. 
8.   Eligible collateral includes securities used for tri-party repurchase agreements arranged by the Federal Reserve Bank of NY, as well as all investment-grade corporate securities, municipal securities, MBS and 
ABS for which a price is available. 
9.   Eligible assets: U.S. dollar-denominated certificates of deposit, bank notes, and CP, with remaining maturity of 7 to 90 days. Assets must be issued by one of ten designated financial institutions and be rated 
A1/P1/F1 by at least two of the rating agencies. 
10.  Maximum holding of the SPV of any single issuer is limited to the maximum amount of paper outstanding by that issuer between January 1, 2008 and August 31, 2008. 
11.  TSLF conducts Schedule 1 auctions involving exchanges of all securities used in tri-party repos and schedule 2 auctions involving collateral in the schedule 1 auctions plus investment-grade corporate 
securities, municipal securities, mortgage-backed securities, and ABS. 
12.  Limit of $150 billion for each auction. 
13.  Eligible borrowers include business entities that are organized under the laws of the United States or a political subdivision or territory thereof (including such an entity that has a non-U.S. parent com-
pany) or U.S. branches or agencies of foreign banks. 
14.  Eligible collateral includes highly rated ABS backed by certain consumer and business debt and could be expanded to certain assets backed by residential or commercial mortgages. An SPV will be created by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to purchase any assets acquired through TALF lending with the first $100 billion of funding for the SPV provided by the U.S. Treasury. 
Box 2:  Federal Reserve Bank Credit
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Program/Enhancement         Participants                                       Description    Limit
Loans to depositories and central banks 
Discount Window* 1   Depository institutions (DIs)2   Collateralized, recourse loans 3  no stated
      limit 
Term Auction Facility (TAF)  DIs eligible for  Collateralized, recourse loans, 28-day and 84-day funding 3  $900 b
(Dec. 12, 2007)1  primary credit   
Forward TAF  (Sept. 29, 2008)  DIs eligible for  Auction of options on term-lending over year-end 3  OBS** 
  primary credit   
Foreign exchange (FX) swaps    Central banks4  Temporary reciprocal currency swap lines between the Federal Reserve and other  $755 b
(Dec. 12, 2007)    central banks to meet the demand for U.S. dollar-denominated funding by foreign DIs 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper  DIs, bank holding companies,  Collateralized, nonrecourse loans to purchase highly rated asset-backed commercial  Amount held
Money Market Fund   U.S. branches and agencies of  paper from money market mutual funds (MMMFs); maturity of funding  by MMMFs
Liquidity Facility (AMLF)  foreign banks  equal to maturity of collateral pledged 5
(Sept. 19, 2008)    
      
Other liquidity and credit market facilities 
Repurchase agreements  Primary dealers  Collateralized, overnight and term loans provided via auctions 7   no stated
overnight* and term 6      limit
Primary Dealer Credit Facility  Primary dealers  Collateralized, recourse, overnight, loans 8  no stated
(PDCF)  (Mar. 16,2008)      limit
Commercial Paper Funding   Highly rated U.S. commercial  Loans to Federal Reserve Bank of NY created Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) investing  no stated
Facility (CPFF)  (Oct. 7, 2008)  paper (CP) issuers and U.S.   in CP of eligible participants   limit
  CP issuers with foreign parents   
Money Market Investor Funding   U.S. 2a-7 MMMFs  Federal Reserve Bank of NY provides senior secured loans to private SPVs that invest  $540 b 10
Facility (MMIFF)  (Oct. 21, 2008)    in eligible assets issued by designated financial institutions 9 
Overnight Securities Lending*  Primary dealers  Treasury general collateral (from the Federal Reserve System Open Market Account)   no stated
    available to primary dealers via auction   limit
Term Securities Lending   Primary dealers  Treasury general collateral (from the System Open Market Account) available  $200 b
Facility (TSLF)  (Mar. 11, 2008)    via auction for 28-day maturity 11 
TSLF Options (TOP)   Primary dealers  Auction of options to borrow Treasury securities from the TSLF  OBS 12
(Sept. 29, 2008)     
Term Asset-Backed Securities   Eligible U.S. borrowers  Nonrecourse loans of up to three years, fully secured by eligible ABS  $1 tr
Loan Facility (TALF)  holding qualified  The U.S. Treasury provides up to $100 billion of credit protection14
(Program announced on  asset-backed securities13 
Nov. 25, 2008, and launched   (ABS)
on Mar. 3, 2009)
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Program/Enhancement         Participants                                       Description     Limit 
Federal Reserve U.S. Treasury and agency securities held directly 
U.S. Treasury Securities*  Primary dealers  Open market purchases from primary dealers  
GSE direct   Primary dealers  Federal Reserve Bank of NY makes purchases of direct
obligations (Nov. 25, 2008)15    GSE obligation from primary dealers
Federal agency MBS   Selected asset managers  Purchases of agency MBS conducted by asset managers selected
(Nov. 25, 2008)15    via a competitive process
 
Federal Reserve Direct Financial Assistance Facilities 
Maiden Lane LLC 16  Federal Reserve Bank of NY  Nonrecourse loan to the LLC
(July 3, 2008)  established the LLC  to acquire
  selected assets of Bear Stearns in
  connection with the acquisition
  by JP Morgan Chase. 
AIG credit  Federal Reserve Bank of  Loans guaranteed by AIG assets
(Sept. 16, 2008)17  NY established the LLC to
  acquire assets of AIG. 
Maiden Lane II LLC   Federal Reserve Bank of NY  Nonrecourse loan to the LLC
(Nov. 10, 2008)  established the LLC to acquire
  residential MBS from AIG’s U.S. 
  securities lending collateral 
  portfolio. 
Maiden Lane III LLC  Federal Reserve Bank of NY  Nonrecourse loan to the LLC
(Nov. 10, 2008)  established the LLC to acquire 
  multisector collateralized debt 
  obligations on which AIG has 
  written credit default swap 
  contracts. 
Citigroup (Nov. 23, 2008)  Citigroup  Treasury and FDIC provide protection against a pool of Citigroup’s asset; Federal 
    Reserve to provide a nonrecourse loan to “backstop” residual risk in 
    Citigroup’s asset pool
Bank of America Corp. (BAC)  Bank of America Corp.  Treasury and FDIC provide protection against a pool of BAC assets; Federal Reserve to 
(Jan. 16, 2009)    provide a nonrecourse loan to “backstop” residual risk in BAC’s asset pool











Box 2 (continued):  Federal Reserve Bank Credit
* Previously established program or facility.   ** Off balance sheet.
15.  Purchases of direct obligations of, and obligations fully guaranteed as to principal-interest by, any U.S. government agencies, under the direction of the FOMC, are permitted under section 14(b) of the 
Federal Reserve Act. Explicit programs to purchase direct obligations of GSEs Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Federal Home Loan Banks and MBS backed by housing agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
Ginnie Mae) were announced on November 25, 2008. 
16.  Limited Liability Corporation. 
17.  Terms were modified on November 10, 2008, and on March 2, 2009. Based on latter modification, the revolving credit facility is to be reduced from $60 billion to no less than $25 billion. In return for the 
reduction in the revolving credit facility, the Federal Reserve Bank of NY will get preferred interest in two SPVs created to hold common shares of two life insurance subsidiaries of AIG. The Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York is authorized to make up to $8.5 billion in new loans to SPVs established by domestic life insurance subsidiaries of AIG.             
18.  Asset pool is valued at $306 billion.             

































Direct Financial Assistance (AIG Credit, 
Maiden Lane LLCs) $109.5 b*
Commercial Paper Funding Facility LLC 
$250.4 b*
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper MMMF 
Liquidity Facility $13.9 b*
Primary dealer and other broker dealer 
credit $26.0 b*
Term Securities Lending Facility $115.3 b*
Foreign exchange swaps $379.7 b*
Term Auction Credit Facility $447.6 b*
Discount window $66.0 b*
Overnight Securities Lending  
Facility $6.1 b*
Repurchase agreements $0.0 b*
U.S. Treasuries and agency securities held 
outright less securities lent to dealers 
$449.0 b*
Other credit $43.9 b*
* as of Feb. 18, 2009
markets. For primary dealers, these tools pro-
vide  access  to  collateralized  loans  from  the 
Federal  Reserve  and  the  option  to  borrow 
Treasury securities.3 For others, these measures 
provide liquidity for money market securities 
held by money market mutual funds, support 
the extension of credit to highly rated issuers 
of commercial paper, and enable the Federal 
Reserve to purchase both the direct obligations 
of  Fannie  Mae,  Freddie  Mac,  and  the  Fed-
eral  Home  Loan  Banks  and  agency  MBS  to 
help lower mortgage interest rates. The Term   
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), 
which  was  launched  in  early  2009,  is  di-
rected at supporting the particularly hard-hit   
asset-backed securities market, which is instru-
mental to the flow of credit for consumer loans, 
student  loans,  business  loans,  and  certain 
mortgages that are not eligible for inclusion in 
securities guaranteed by the housing GSEs. 
Finally,  a  number  of  tools  made  possible 
under the Federal Reserve’s emergency pow-
ers  involve  targeted  financial  assistance  to 
preserve the stability of systemically critical fi-
nancial institutions. For example, these include 
the credit facilities established by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York in connection with 
the  acquisition  of  Bear  Stearns  by  JPMorgan 
Chase  and  the  efforts  to  stabilize  insurance 
giant  American  International  Group  (AIG).
Fed turns to unconventional policy tools 
Chart 4
Federal Reserve Bank Credit
3	 The	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York	trades	U.S.	government	securities	and	other	selected	securities	with	designated	primary	dealers,	
which	include	banks	and	securities	broker-dealers.
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Chart 5
Commercial Paper Risk Spreads
(Spreads over 30-day AA Nonfinancial Rate)
The Fed’s Growing Balance Sheet
The  implementation  of  these  policy  tools 
has  substantially  changed  the  composition 
and, since mid-September 2008, the size of the 
Federal  Reserve  System’s  balance  sheet  (see 
Chart 4).4 The Federal Reserve’s balance sheet 
expanded  rapidly  toward  the  latter  part  of 
2008 with the deterioration in financial market 
conditions  that  led  to  the  failure  of  Lehman 
Brothers, followed by the near collapse of AIG, 
the “run” on prime money market funds, the 
severe dislocations in commercial paper mar-
kets, and the general flight to quality by inves-
tors seeking the safety of Treasury securities.5 
At the beginning of 2009, Federal Reserve Bank 
credit  reached  about  $2.3  trillion,  compared 
with about $900 billion prior to the start of the 
financial turmoil.
It  is  difficult  to  assess  the  effects  of  indi-
vidual facilities on particular markets, let alone 
the  impact  on  overall  financial  conditions. 
Along  with  the  Federal  Reserve  initiatives, 
the federal government undertook a number 
of efforts to support financial markets, includ-
ing the Treasury Department’s Troubled Asset 
Relief Program, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Signs of improvement in commercial paper market
Corporation’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee 
Program, and the placement of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie  Mac  in  conservatorship.  These  pro-
grams were designed to work with the Federal 
Reserve initiatives to mitigate the effects of the 
dislocation in financial markets. Indeed, there 
are signs that stress in financial markets eased 
from the crescendo reached in mid-September 
2008. The improvement was evident in lower 
risk spreads in commercial paper markets (see 
Chart 5) and in a narrowing of the spreads on 
the  term  Libor  relative  to  the  OIS  rates  (see 
Chart 1), though the latter remained somewhat 
elevated.  In  other  markets  targeted  by  the 
Federal Reserve initiatives, risk premiums on 
GSE-backed MBS moved lower in late 2008 and 
early 2009, helping to bring down interest rates 
on conforming mortgages.
Looking forward, the use of the Federal Re-
serve’s balance sheet to restore financial stabili-
ty and economic growth has become even more 
important, with the federal funds rate close to 
zero at the beginning of 2009. In addition, the 
Federal Reserve’s communications to the public 
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